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The Religion Clause: A Double 
Guarantee of Religious Liberty 
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, ~ r . "  
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS 
WARFARE AND THE RELIGION CLAUSE 
AS "ARTICLES OF PEACE" 
The term "religious warfare" may sound like an oxymoron, 
for religion is frequently associated with a commitment to 
nonviolence. For example, Jesus amended the law of the 
talion' with a teaching that many of his disciples in 
* Dean and Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. O 1993 
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr. 
1. The law of the talion is a provision in the Code of the Covenant, Exodus 
21-23, requiring that damages be paid in a tort claim arising from an injury to a 
pregnant woman. Exodus 21:23-24; see also Leviticus 24:19. The phrase "life for 
life," Exodus 21:23, is often incorrectly interpreted to reflect either an actual 
practice of death penalty in ancient Israel or a biblical warrant for the death 
penalty in our times. Similarly, the rest of the law of the talion-"eye for eye, 
tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, 
stripe for stripe," Exodus 21:24-is incorrectly interpreted to mean that ancient 
Israelite courts actually maimed defendants in tort actions. The context of this 
passage, however, suggests that this law functioned to mitigate damages in tort 
claims. For example, .the immediately preceding verse clearly refers not to 
maiming, but to damages that the defendant "shall pay in the presence of the 
judges." Exodus 21:22. And the verses immediately aRer the law of the talion also 
suggest that this law refers to damages: 'When a man strikes his male or female 
slave in the eye and destroys the use of the eye, he shall let the slave go free in 
compensation for the eye. If he knocks out a tooth of his male or female slave, he 
shall let the slave go free in compensation for the tooth." Exodus 21:26-27 (New 
American Bible). Thus the law of the talion functioned to measure the amount of 
damages appropriate for a particular sort of injury. As with modern tort claims, 
loss of an eye was compensated more than the loss of a tooth. Cf. DALE PATRICK, 
OLD TESTAMENT LAW 77 (1985) (stating the principle that a person should suffer to 
the degree they caused suffering). For extrabiblical literature that confirms this 
interpretation of the law of the talion, see Articles 195-282 of the Code of 
Hamrnurabi (1792-1750 B.C.E.), a series of cases setting forth the monetary 
damages for tort claims. For example, Article 198 provides: Yf he has destroyed 
the eye of a commoner or broken the bone of a commoner, he shall pay one mina 
of silver." The Code of Hammurabi, in 1 THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST: AN ANTHOLOGY 
OF TEXTS AND PICTURES 138, 161-67 (James B. Pritchard ed., 1958); see also OLD 
TESTAMENT PARALLELS: LAWS AND STORIES FROM THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST 66 
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subsequent centuries have found hard: "Do not resist an 
e~ildoer."~ Although Mohandas Gandhi (1869-1948) was a 
Hindu, he made this teaching the core of his moral practice and 
with it brought down the mighty British Ern~i re .~  Similarly, 
the great Baptist preacher, Martin Luther King, Jr., also made 
creative nonviolence the heart of his preaching and practice;' 
with which he led an historic struggle to  end Jim Crow 
laws-the segregation codes that might aptly be termed 
apartheid, American-style.5 
But for many, the teaching of Jesus on nonviolence is hard 
to observe. Following this teaching has led some of his disciples 
to a death like his.6 The difficulty of this teaching has also led 
others-probably most-of his disciples to reject it. For 
example, at least by the late fourth century when Christianity 
became the official, established religion of the Roman Empire, 
the duty to serve the Emperor became a religious duty. By the 
early fifth century, Augustine, Bishop of Hippo in northern 
Africa, had elaborated a theory according to which war was 
justifiable; he could even exhort the Emperor to use violence as 
a means of coercing dissident Christians or  heretics either t o  
conform to the orthodox teaching of the church or to die. By the 
eleventh century, the Popes were preaching a "Crusade," a war 
under the sign of the cross which marked the breastplate of the 
(Victor H. Matthews & Don C. Benjamin eds., 1991). 
2. Matthew 5:39 (New Revised Standard Version). 
3. See MOHANDAS K .  GANDHI, NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE (1961); THE GANDHI 
READER (Homer A. Jack ed., 1956). 
4. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE, CHAOS OR 
COMMUNITY? (1968); MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRENGTH TO LOVE (1964); MARTIN 
LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T W A ~  (1963); MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE 
TOWARD FREEDOM: THE MONTGOMERY STORY (1958). King, the Pastor of Ebenezer 
Baptist Church in Atlanta, was the founding President of the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference (SCLC). For an account of the role of SCLC in the historic 
civil rights movement, see TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE 
KING YEARS, 1954-63 (1988); ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT (1984); and BAYARD RUSKIN, STRATEGIES FOR FREEDOM (1976). 
5. For an account of the apartheid system of American law after Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), see C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF 
JIM CROW (3d ed. 1974). 
6. Many of the early Christian martyrs died as witnesses to their conviction 
that "Jesus is Lord," 1 Corinthians 12:3; Philippians 2:11, a religious oath of 
fidelity they deemed incompatible with the claim of Roman law, "Caesar is Lord," 
that formed the sacramentum or oath of office of a Roman soldier. See ADOLPH 
HARNAcK, MILITIA CHRISTI: THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION AND THE MILITARY IN THE 
FIRST THREE CENTURIES 54, 76 (David M. Gracie trans., 1981) (referring to 
TERTUILIAN, ON IDOLATRY, ch. 19). 
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Crusaders. Thus was the cross of Christ, a sacred symbol of the 
redemptive nonviolent suffering on behalf of all the nations, 
sacrilegiously transformed into the sign of brutal and vicious 
military conquest and slaughter of the infidel Jews and 
Muslims in the City of Peace, Jerusalem.? 
After the Reformation of the western church in the 
sixteenth century,' Europe was scarred by frequent outbursts 
of violence, related, in part at least, to religious commitments. 
For example, the Peace of Augsburg (1555) .put an end to $he 
violence that had arisen over the spread of Lutheran belief in  
the territories of the Holy Roman Empire. Protestant princes, 
united in a confederation known as the Protestant League, 
extorted an end to these battles from Emperor Charles V, a 
Catholic. According to these articles of peace: 
Every land that was Lutheran [i.e., governed by a Lutheran 
prince] before 1552 might remain so legally, and for the 
fbture every ruler of a state was given the choice between the 
old religion [Catholicism] and the Lutheran, and his subjects 
were to abide by his decision or peaceably leave the 
7. Sir Steven Runciman concludes his magisterial treatment of the Crusades 
as follows: 
There was so much courage and so little honour, so much devotion and 
so little understanding. High ideals were besmirched by cruelty and 
greed, enterprise and endurance by a blind and narrow self-righteousness; 
and the Holy War itself was nothing more than a long act of intolerance 
in the name of God, which is the sin against the Holy Ghost. 
3 STEVEN RUNCIMAN, A HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES 480 (1954); see also ROLAND H. 
BAINTON, CHRISTIAN A ~ D E S  TOWARD WAR AND PEACE: A HISTORICAL SURVEY 
AND CRITICAL RE-EVALUATION 111-16 (1960); HANS E. MAYER, THE CRUSADES 
(1972). 
8. The attitude of Martin Luther toward war was ambivalent. On the one 
hand, he invoked Acts 5:29 (We must obey God rather than menw) for the 
conclusion that "we should neither follow nor help a prince who desired to go to 
war [ifl his cause was clearly unrighteous." 44 MARTIN LUTHER, Treatise on Good 
Works, in LUTHER'S WORKS 15, 100 (Helmut T. Lehmann ed., 1966) (1520); see also 
46 MARTIN LUTHER, Open Letter on the Harsh Book Against the Peasants, in 
LUTHER'S WORKS, supra, at 63, 77 (1525); 46 MARTIN LUTHER, Whether Soldiers, 
Too, Can Be Saved?, in LUTHER'S WORKS, supra, at 87, 130 (1526). On the other 
hand, Luther clearly contemplates in the same texts that there may be some 
instances in which a prince waging war justly should be obeyed. For example, 
Article 16 of the Augsburg Confession (1530) provides that a Christian may wage 
war justly (jure bellare). For a commentary on this article of the Confession, see 
GEORGE W. FORELL & JAMES F. MCCUE, CONFESSING ONE FAITH: A JOINT 
COMMENTARY ON THE AUGSBURG CONFESSION BY LUTHERAN AND CATHOLIC 
THEOLOGIANS 322-33 (1982). 
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state-the famous principle of cujus regio ejus religio [whose 
region, his religion], though the actual phrase is later.g 
Similarly, prompted by the territorial wars which ensued 
even after the Peace of Augsburg, the Formula of Concord 
(1577) established not only a rigorous peace but also contained 
"an uncompromising [Lutheran] exclusion of the Reformed 
[Calvinis t ]  doctrine of t h e  Eucha r i s t  a n d  . . . of 
predestination."1° At least in its early phase, the Thirty Years 
Wai. was a war of Calvinists against Catholics, with Lutherans 
remaining aloof." The provoking incident occurred on April 
11, 1606, when Protestants attacked a Catholic ceremonial 
procession in the heavily Protestant city of Donauworth in 
southern Germany. A year later Maximilian of Bavaria 
occupied the city, annexed it to Bavaria, installed Jesuits in the 
church, and made it "forcibly Catholic."" "In 1608 the 
Protestant states formed the Evangelical Union to defend 
Protestant states attacked in contravention of the Peace of 
Aug~burg."'~ Led by Maximilian of Bavaria, Catholics formed 
a rival alliance known as the Catholic League in the same 
year. The war came to an end with the Peace of Westphalia in 
1645. Although the war was fought over political rivalry as 
much as religious c~rnmitments,'~ it is recalled as a classic 
instance of "religious warfare." 
In  England, the struggle to establish Parliamentary 
hegemony was likewise marked by deep religious commitments. 
The Royalist banners unfurled on the battlefields of the Civil 
War read, "For God, For King, For Country." The banners of 
the Cromwellians read, "Pray Fervently, Fight ~ o l d l ~ . " ' ~  
Across the sea in what George Bernard Shaw called "John 
Bull's Other Island," the Irish experienced not only eight 
centuries of foreign rule, but also cruel denial of their religious 
liberty.16 The dissolution of the monasteries by Henry VIII 
9. OWEN CHADWICK, THE REFORMATION 143 (1972). 
10. Id. at 144. 
11. Id. at 317. 
12. Id. at 316. 
13. Id. 
14. "After 1635 the war was no longer in any real sense a religious war, but a 
modern European war dependent on rivalry between revived France and imperial 
Germany." Id. at 317. 
15. For a brief discussion of the Puritan Revolution from the perspective of a 
history of war, see BAINTON, supra note 7, at 147-51. See also DEREK HIRST, 
AUTHORITY AND CONFUCT: ENGLAND, 1603-1658, at 221-363 (1986). 
16. See 3 A NEW H I ~ R Y  OF IRELAND: EARLY MODERN IRELAND (Theodore W. 
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devastated the Catholic community in Ireland as well as in 
England," and the Penal Laws enacted under Elizabeth I 
criminally punished Roman Catholics for exercising their 
religious commitments.1s The armies, first of Cromwell and 
later of William of Orange, slaughtered innocent Irish civilians 
by the thousands.lg The Protestant rulers illegally confiscated 
the lands and homes of the natives and gave them to the 
Presbyterians "planted" there by "Good King Billy."20 
More recently, the continuous violence in the northern part 
of Ireland has been characterized by uninformed media reports 
as a "religious war." I have no brief to write for this violence, 
but I do not view it primarily in religious terms. It strikes me 
as a struggle primarily over the legitimacy of imperial 
domination and the continuous denial of political and civil 
rights to people because of their religious commitments. I t  is, 
moreover, about as probable to  believe that the occupying 
British Army is an effective peace-keeping force in Ireland as it 
is to think that the U.S. Marines could keep the peace in 
Lebanoa2' 
However one characterizes the protracted conflict in the 
northern part of Ireland, we do not lack recent evidence of 
religiously grounded violence. Bosnia is torn apart by violent 
conflict between Serbs and Muslims. In Lebanon and Israel, 
bloody strife continues between Jew and Arab and between 
Moody et al. eds., 1976). 
17. The two statutes ordering the dissolution of the monasteries were 27 Hen. 
8, ch. 28 (1536), 31 Hen. 8, ch. 13 (1539); see BRENDON BRADSHAW, THE 
DISSOLUTION OF THE REIJGIOUS ORDERS IN IRELAND UNDER HENRY VaI (1974). 
18. See S.T. BONDOFF, TUDOR ENGLAND 212-46 (1950); GEOFFREY R. ELTON, 
REFORM AND REFORMATION: ENGLAND, 1509-1558 (1977); GEOFFREY R. ELTON, 
ENGLAND UNDER THE TUDORS (1955). 
19. See T.C. BARNARD, CROMWELUN IRELAND (1975). 
20. The Irish who remember the invasion of William of Orange from the 
underside usually stomp their feet twice when they say "God bless King Billy." It 
is like the custom of observant Jews who make a lot of noise when the name of 
Haman, prototypical enemy of the Jews, is mentioned in the reading of the Book 
of Esther at the feast of Purim. For a dispassionate analysis of the British attitude 
toward the native Irish and the native Americans in the seventeenth century, see 
William Bassett, The Myth of the Nomad in Property Law, 4 J.L. & RELIGION 133 
(1986). 
21. The most obvious difference in this comparison is that Northern Ireland is 
part of the United Kingdom, whereas Lebanon is not part of the United States. 
The point of the comparison, however, is that many of the contending natives in 
both places resent the presence of foreigners who are obviously committed to one 
side of an ongoing conflict. 
194 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
Arab and Arab. In Iran and Iraq a jihad has been waged 
ferociously over the past decade. 
These images of religiously grounded violence throughout 
the world lend a note of urgency to the conversation reflected 
in this symposium. It  is important that we grasp correctly the 
meaning of the First Amendment Religion Clause. The 
importance of doing so is crucial not only to our republic, but 
also to many parts of the world that do not live with the 
blessing of the First Amendment. 
Some scholars, notably William Marshall, Lawrence Solum, 
and Jeffrey Stout, have suggested that the story of violence 
sometimes associated with religion leads in the direction of 
placing strong societal limits on religion.22 Dean Mark 
Schwehn summarizes the arguments of Professor Stout as 
follows: 
Stout opposes efforts to strengthen the public influence of 
religion in part because he remains even today traumatized 
by the religious wars of the seventeenth century, events that 
constitute the crucial episode in the formation of the academic 
conscience of the West. Thus, for example, Stout characterizes 
our society's recognition that the good life must allow for our 
inability to agree upon any one model of the good life as 
phronesis "forged in the religious strife of early modern 
Europe." He argues that theology has lost credibility among 
intellectuals largely because it "was unable to provide a 
vocabulary for debating and deciding matters without resort 
to violence." And he often thinks of contemporary religion in 
terms of Belfast and Beirut, Teheran and Lynchburg, places 
that give him "ample reasons for concern."23 
Schwehn acknowledges that passionate religious commitments 
have led to destructive tribalism and violence. But he notes 
with equal force the evil of wholly secular totalitarian regimes 
of the left and right that have left behind human carnage by 
the millions in our own century. Thus, he concludes sensibly 
that  Stout's "highly selective recognition of the past" should not 
serve as a warrant for the repression or privatization of 
22. See WILLIAM P. MARSHALL, THE PUBLIC SQUARE AND THE OTHER SIDE OF 
RELIGION (forthcoming 1993); JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL: THE LANGUAGE 
OF MORALS AND THEIR DISCONTENTS 222-23, 238 (1988); Lawrence B. Solum, Faith 
and Justice, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1083, 1096-97 (1990). 
23. MARK R. SCHWEHN, EXILES FROM EDEN: RELIGION AND THE ACADEMIC 
VOCATION IN AMERICA 54 (1993) (quoting STOUT, supra note 22, at 223, 238). 
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religion, any more than a mention of Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and 
Pol Pot should serve as an argument against secularism per 
In short, Professors Marshall, Solum, and Stout prove too 
much when they suggest that explicitly religious arguments 
must be avoided in public discourse so as to avoid the 
repetition of the "holy wars" of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. Their fears, however, might be allayed if the virtues 
of "technical competence, civil intelligibility, and political 
courtesy'' were viewed as imperatives for both religious and 
nonreligious participants in public policy debate.25 But I 
would not place upon religious discourse any stricter regulation 
than that which is permissible for secular speech.26 
Although I am frightened by images of religiously 
grounded violence elsewhere, I note that they are abroad, and 
that  we have found a different way of dealing with our deepest 
differences in  the American experience. For that very reason, I 
think that we should tone down some of the excessive rhetoric 
about a "culture war" now raging in A~nerica.~' When 
measured against the real shedding of real blood involved in  
the real wars abroad, our struggles over cultural influence and 
control are quite tame. That is not to say that we can afford to 
go about our business with reckless disregard for courtesy. On 
the contrary, as  the Williamsburg Charter-a bicentennial 
document celebrating religious liberty-puts it, "The issue is 
not only what we debate, but The Charter states: 
24. Id. 
25. J. Bryan Hehir, Responsibilities and Temptations of Power: A Catholic View, 
8 J.L. & RELIGION 71, 82 (1988); see also FREDERICK M. GEDICKS & ROGER 
HENDRM, CHOOSING THE DREAM: THE FUTURE OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC 
LIFE (1991); RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE (1984); Edward M. 
Gaffney, Politics Without Brackets on Religious Convictions: Michael Perry and 
Bruce Ackmman on Neutrality, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1143, 1188-94 (1989); Frederick M. 
Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671 (1992). 
26. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
27. See JAMES D. HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 
(1991). Professor Hunter maintains that his title is simply a translation of the 
German term, Kulturkumpf. Since the Geman word for "war" is not Kampf, but 
=kg, it might be more accurate to speak of a cultural struggle, of great 
magnitude and moment, than to speak of culture wars. For all the modish 
appropriation of militaristic metaphors by groups like the National Organization for 
Women, which describes their strategy planning office as the "war room," it might 
help elevate the tone of political discourse if all of us would tone down our 
excessive rhetoric. 
28. The Williamsburg Charter, 8 J.L. & RELIGION 5, 11 (1990). The Charter 
committed its signatories to the propositions that "those who claim the right to 
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The Religious Liberty provisions are not "articles of faith" 
concerned with the substance of particular doctrines or of 
policy issues. They are "articles of peace" concerned with the 
constitutional constraints and the shared prior understanding 
within which the American people can engage their 
differences in a civil manner and thus provide for both 
religious liberty and stable public g~vernrnent.'~ 
Against this preliminary discussion of the Religion Clause 
as "articles of peace," I wish t o  explore three points about "new 
, directions in religious liberty." First, the two provisions of the 
First Amendment Religious Liberty Clause-one prohibiting 
the establishment of religion and the other guaranteeing the 
free exercise of religion-ar e not contradictory in any sense, 
but are "mutually reinforcing provisions [that] act as a double 
guarantee of religious liberty."30 Second, although religious 
freedom as a significant constitutional value began to erode 
long before William H. Rehnquist became the Chief Justice in 
1986, it has come to a low point in the past few years. Third, I 
explore the impact of Employment Division v. Smith3' on the 
lower courts and other government agencies and conclude that 
remedial legislation is sorely needed to restore the fmt of civil 
liberties to the position of honor it deserves in our republic. 
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROHIBITION AGAINST 
AN ESTABLISHMENT OF R.EXIGION AND THE GUARANTEE 
OF FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION 
First, I will attempt to  reconcile free exercise concerns and 
the prohibition against a governmental establishment of 
religion. This point is fundamental to any interpretation of the 
First Amendment. Functionally, it makes sense for litigators to 
proceed as though there were two separate provisions dealing 
with religion, but I concede this point only because the case 
law of the modem period has done so. Able historians like 
Thomas Curry have noted that the two ways of speaking of 
influence should accept the responsibility not to inflame," id. at 20, and "those who 
claim the right to participate should accept the responsibility to persuade." Id. at 
2 1. 
29. Id. at 12. The conception of the Religious Liberty Clause as "articles of 
peace" was articulated in JOHN C. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC 
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 45-79 (1960). 
30. The Williamsburg Charter, supra no* 28, at 6. 
31. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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religion in the First Amendment were almost interchangeable 
and virtually indistinguishable in the eighteenth century.s2 
The bifurcation of the Religion Clause in the modern 
period has led to serious problems in theory, in the metaphors 
used to describe the theory, and in  practice. An example of this 
theoretical confusion is the conflict the Court built into the 
standards announced in Lemon u. Kurtzmans3 for determining 
a violation of the Establishment Clause. Lemon teaches that  
the Establishment Clause criteria prohibited any government 
practice that did not have a secular purpose.34 A year later 
the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause may only be 
invoked by adherents to a religious faith, not to a general 
secular view.35 It makes little sense as a matter of logic that  
the Establishment Clause must prohibit what the Free 
Exercise Clause requires. And if that result did not make for 
coherent constitutional theory, the theory became worse in  
Smith, when the so-called tension between the clauses was 
removed by eliminating the vigor and force of the Free Exercise 
Clause. That is like fixing a headache by lopping off the head. 
In his characteristically humorous manner, Jim Gordon put it 
this way: '[According to the Smith case,] the free exercise 
clause . . . generously permits you to have whatever religious 
beliefs you want. You just can't 'exercise' them. I t  is comforting 
to know that the protection of religious liberty in America is 
now just as broad as it is in NORTH KOREA."36 I realize that 
this is a gross exaggeration to which the North Koreans might 
take exception. 
The "metaphors" the Court has chosen to describe the 
relationship between the two parts of the Religion Clause are 
not very helpful either. Chief Justice Burger suggested the 
image of a ship captain struggling to find a "neutral course 
between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in 
absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical 
extreme, would tend to clash with the other.7737 Taking this 
metaphor further, Chief Justice Rehnquist has described the 
32. THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA 
TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 216-17 (1986). 
33. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
34. Id. at 612. 
35. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 US. 205, 215 (1972). 
36. James D. Gordon 111, An Unofficial Guide to the Bill of Rights, 1992 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 371, 371. 
37. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 US. 664, 668-89 (1970). 
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relationship between the two Clauses as a narrow channel 
bordered by a Scylla and a Charybdis through which the Court 
must steer.3s This surely qualifies for the New Yorker's "Block 
that Metaphor" column. It  is especially inappropriate because it 
implies a negative connotation for both parts of the Religion 
Clause, imagined to be twin perils or dangers, neither of which 
could be evaded without risking the other.39 The metaphors 
the Court uses make it appear as if James Madison and his 
colleagues had  planned a big tug-of-war between 
disharmonious and brutal rivals by craRing the first two 
provisions of the First Amendment in a way that made little 
sense without the valiant efforts of the Court in the late 
twentieth century to "reconcile" the seeming "conflict" between 
them?' 
An example of the practical confusion in this area is that 
the Court has created two different standards for who may 
bring an Establishment Clause complaint and who may allege 
a free exercise violation. The point is not a fine academic one, 
but one with important practical consequences. Without a 
clearer understanding of the relationship between the two 
parts of the Religion Clause, the outcome of religious liberty 
cases will depend on the cleverness of lawyers characterizing a 
case as  one arising under the establishment provision or the 
free exercise provision. In my view, that is no blessing to the 
republic. 
The Williamsburg Charter notes that the two parts of the 
Religion Clause are "mutually reinforcing provisions [that] act 
as a double guarantee of religious liberty. . . . Together the 
clauses form a strong bulwark against suppression of religious 
liberty."41 One of the drafters of the Charter, Richard John 
Neuhaus, has written: 
The conventional wisdom is that there are two religion 
clauses that must somehow be "balanced," one against the 
38. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 721 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 
see also Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 28 (1989) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring); id. at 42 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
39. Scylla was a dangerous rock on the Italian side of the Straits of Messina; 
Charybdis was a nearby whirlpool; these perils were represented as female 
monsters in ancient mythology. 
40. See Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal 
Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
311 (1986). 
41. The Williamsburg Charter, supra note 28, at 6, 16. 
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other. But these provisions of the First Amendment are not 
against each other. Each is in the service of the other. More 
precisely, there is one religion clause, not two. The meaning 
of a "clause," apart from the narrowly grammatical, is that it 
is an article or stipulation. The two-part religion clause of the 
First Amendment stipulates that there must be no law 
respecting an establishment of religion. The reason for this is 
to avoid any infringement of the free exercise of religion. 
Non-establishment is not a good in itself, i t  does not stand on 
its own feet. The positive good is free exercise, to which 
non-establishment is i n s t r ~ m e n t a l . ~ ~  
I do not read Neuhaus to  be downplaying either the 
historical or the contemporary significance of the prohibition 
against an established religion. I read him simply to be 
reminding us that the reason for the prohibition of an 
established religion-both at the time of the framing and 
now-is to promote religious liberty. Non-establishment of 
religion is "instrumental" in this sense. As philosophers know, 
however, the term "instrumental" is not a term of derision; it is 
language borrowed from an Aristotelian understanding of 
causation that indicates the channel through which the goal of 
religious liberty is attained in our society.43 
Professor Franklin Gamwell of the University of Chicago 
Divinity School has proposed that we think of the free exercise 
guarantee as the establishment of the religious question in 
America, and that we think of the no-establishment provision 
as the prohibition of a governmental answer to that question. 
This is a dramatically different approach to  Professor 
Marshall's suggestion that we should not really try to get out of 
the Religion Clause anything more than we could get out of the 
rest of the First Amendment." To quote again from the 
Williamsburg Charter: 
Far from being a sub-category of free speech or a 
constitutional redundancy, religious liberty is  distinct and 
42. Richard J. Neuhaus, Contending for the Future: Overcoming the pfefferian 
Inversion, 8 J.L. & RELIGION 115, 115-16 (1990); see also Richard J. Neuhaus, A 
New Order of Religious Freedom, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 620, 626-31 (1992). 
43. Aristotle's discussion of four kinds of causes or explanatory 
principles-efficient, final, material, and formal-is found in his METAPHYSICS 1.3 
(W.D. Ross ed., 1988). See also Ruliard Taylor, Causation, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PHILOSOPHY 56 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967). 
44. William P. Marshall, Solving the f i e  Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as 
Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545, 575-93 (1983). 
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foundational. Far from being simply an individual right, 
religious liberty is a positive social good. Far from denigrating 
religion as a social or political "problem," the separation of 
Church and State is both the saving of religion &om the 
temptation of political power and an achievement inspired in 
large part by religion itself. Far from weakening religion, 
disestablishment has, as an historical fact, enabled it to 
flourish.45 
In the interests of religious liberty, both provisions are 
crucial; as double guarantees, they provide a framework from 
which we, as a people, are able to pursue happiness. Because 
they have been viewed as polar, however, the resulting tension 
has tended to erode the understanding that both provisions of 
the Religion Clause are meant to foster and protect religious 
freedom. 
11. THE EROSION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
BEFORE THE REHNQUIST COURT 
With notable exceptionsf there is broad consensus 
among scholars and religious leaders that the Court erred 
grievously in Employment Division v.  Smith.47 I regard Smith 
as the nadir of judicial contempt for the first of our civil 
liberties. To defend this conclusion, it is necessary to trace the 
broad contours of the development of free exercise doctrine. 
Because they are familiar, I do so briefly. 
In the first period of the republic, the Bill of Rights had no 
application to the several states, but governed the regulatory 
reach only of the national g ~ v e r n m e n t . ~ ~  And in its first 
application to congressional legislation, the Free Exercise 
Clause proved but a parchment barrier to statutes that codified 
massive hostility against the Mormons. In a series of three 
45. The Williamsburg Charter, supra note 28, at 17. 
46. Professors William Marshall, Mark Tushnet, and Ellis West have argued 
that the Free Exercise Clause should not be relied upon for exemptions from 
generally applicable laws. See Marshall, supra note 22; William P. Marshall, The 
Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 357 (1989); Mark V. Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme 
Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 373; Mark V. Tushnet, The 
Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691 
(1988); Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 591 (1990). 
47. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
48. Barron v. Mayor & City Council, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
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cases in the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court 
reinforced with judicial authority the hostility toward the 
Mormons manifested in the congressional legislation that 
singled them out in an invidious manner.49 In the first case, 
Reynolds v. United States," the Court ruled that Congress 
could impose criminal sanctions against the Mormon practice of 
plural marriage; the Court noted, however, that religious 
beliefs were beyond the regulatory reach of the government.51 
In the second case, Davis v. Beason:' the belief-conduct 
distinction the Court had touted in Reynolds was exposed as a 
sham, for Mormons were deprived of the franchise because of 
their belief in plural marriage. In the third case, aptly styled 
Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. United States,s3 the Court went still further, 
divesting the Mormon church of its property until it changed 
its view on plural marriage. This is the sort of dictatorial rule 
that one associates with Henry VIII's dissolution of the 
monasteries in sixteenth century England and Ireland:4 not 
with the spirit of the First Amendment. It is important to note 
that the Smith Court expressly relied on the Reynolds case, 
and implicitly on its progeny, which had ruled that the Free 
Exercise Clause imposed no serious obstacle to congressional 
legislation targeted a t  a vulnerable and unpopular religious 
minority.55 
In 1925, the Supreme Court began the process of 
incorporating various guarantees of the Bill of Rights against 
the several states through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amend~nent .~~  By 1940 the Court thought it 
desirable to extend the reach of the Free Exercise Clause to the 
states as well and did so in Cantwell v. Connectic~t .~~ 
Cantwell marked a breakthrough made possible by the 
49. See GUSTAWS MYERS, HISTORY OF BIGOTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 158-62 
(1940); Frederick M. Gedicks, The Integrity of Survival: A Mormon Response to 
Stanley Hauerwas, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 167 (1992). 
50. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
51. Id. at 164, 166. 
52. 133 U.S. 333 (1890). 
53. 136 U.S. 1 (1890). 
54. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. 
55. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-85 (1990). 
56. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (Free Speech Clause 
applicable to the states); Near v. Minnesota ex reZ. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) 
(Free Press Clause applicable to the states). 
57. 310 U S .  296 (1940). 
202 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
persistence of the Jehovah's Witnesses, who brought to the 
Court's attention a series of cases illustrating the brutality of 
political power intolerant of a small, unpopular minority 
In this respect, the cases involving the Jehovah's 
Witnesses were a harbinger of the stance that the Court was 
later to take against racial discrimination in Brown v. Board of 
Ed~cat ion.~ '  Not only religious minorities, but also racial 
minorities could take comfort from Justice Jackson's assurance 
in  the second flag-salute case that "freedom of worship . . . and 
other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they 
depend on the outcome of no  election^.'"^ This was a solid 
commitment of an independent judiciary that it  would enforce 
the limits placed on our government by the founders in the Bill 
of Rights. 
The begiming of the modern period of free exercise 
doctrine was Sherbert v. Verner,61 which marked an  important 
departure from a series of cases involving Sunday closing laws 
that had been decided adversely to Jews only two years before 
Sherbert.62 In Sherbert, Justice Breman tried to give religious 
freedom more effective protection than it had previously 
enjoyed. To achieve this end, he imported from equal protection 
analysis in cases involving racial discrimination the standard 
requiring the government to show that its interest in a racial 
classification was truly "compelling." After the breakthrough 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education," in case after case 
in the race area, the Court repeatedly told the government that 
no interest that it might articulate on behalf of Jim Crow laws 
(or American apartheid)64 could match this strict standard of 
review.65 
In addition, Justice Brennan reached out to Commerce 
Clause cases such as Dean Milk Co. v. City of M a d i s ~ n , ~ ~  to 
require further that the government must use the "least 
restrictive alternative" to achieve its "compelling interest." In 
58. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pe~sylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
59. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
60. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
61. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
62. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
63. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
64. See WOODWARD, supra note 5. 
65. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating state 
prohibition of interracial marriage). 
66. 340 U.S. 349 (1951). 
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Dean Milk the Court ruled that the City of Madison had a 
powerful interest in the purity of milk sold to its inhabitants. 
But the Court held that this goal could be achieved by 
requiring pasteurization of milk in Illinois as easily as it could 
by requiring that the milk be transported in its raw form up to 
Wisconsin for pasteurization and inspection, then be 
transported back down to Illinois for packaging, and then be 
transported up to Wisconsin again for sale. The Court correctly 
reasoned that the imposition of additional transportation costs 
on the out-of-state farmers was a none-too-subtle way of 
discriminating against them in favor of local merchants. 
By combining these two standards-compelling state 
interest and least restrictive alternative-into one new test for 
the adjudication of claims arising under the Free Exercise 
Clause, the Sherbert court sent a signal to lower courts that 
religious freedom was to be given the same favored status 
accorded to the national commitment to racial equality (Brown 
v. Board of Education) and to the elimination of tariff barriers 
in a national common market (Dean Milk). This new standard 
may not have been perfect. (What test that involves balancing 
is perfect?) But the test proved to be fairly effective in the 
lower courts as a way of safeguarding religious freedom in an  
environment that had become pervasively regulated. 
The new test, moreover, was not limited to the facts of the 
unemployment compensation claim sought by Ms. Sherbert but 
was invoked by the Court as a general principle in virtually all 
the free exercise cases it decided in the past two decades.67 Of 
all these cases involving facts other than an unemployment 
compensation claim, one of the few actually won by a religious 
adherent was Wisconsin v. Yoder!j8 Yoder involved the 
religious claim of Amish parents that their religious practices 
and communal life would be injured by the application of a 
facially neutral, generally applicable norm requiring 
67. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Lyng v. 
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); O'Lone v. Estate 
of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); 
Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985); Bob Jones 
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 
(1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 
437 (1971). 
68. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) 
(invalidating state statute prohibiting clergy from seeking office because it 
conditioned the right to free exercise of religion on the surrender of the right to 
seek office). 
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compulsory school attendance by their children after the eighth 
grade. Professor M c C o ~ e l l  characterizes the cases lost by 
religious claimants as follows: 
Orthodox Jews have been expelled from the military for 
wearing yarmulkes; a religious community in which all 
members worked for the church and believed that acceptance 
of wages would be an affront to God has been forced to yield 
to the minimum wage; religious colleges have been denied tax 
exemptions for enforcing what they regard to be religiously 
compelled moral regulations; Amish farmers who refuse Social 
Security benefits have been forced to pay Social Security 
taxes; and Muslim prisoners have been denied the right to 
challenge prison regulations that conflict with their worship 
schedule?' 
Although purporting to surround free exercise of religion with a 
lot of protection, the Court either trivialized the burden on 
religion imposed by the demands of the modern regulatory 
state or rejected the validity of an exemption based on religious 
grounds. 
In  his article on Smith, Professor McConnell described free 
exercise doctrine before Smith as a sort of Potemkin village,?' 
in which visitors could see with their own eyes Soviets who 
were grateful to Josef Stalin for an abundance of ice cream and 
for other delights of their collectivized lives. Only the most 
gullible tourist could have believed the rosy picture created by 
the Potemkin village, and only a naive observer of religious 
liberty in this country would say that everything has been well 
in order either before or after Smith. At least on paper, 
however, the compelling state interest and least restrictive 
alternative standard appeared to be operative in a unanimous 
decision a s  recently as a few months before Smith.?' 
Whatever may have been true for other cases, the Supreme 
Court has laid down an unbroken line of unemployment 
compensation cases that  are directly relevant to the 
unemployment compensation claim presented in Smith. In this 
line of cases, the Court repeatedly adhered to the doctrine that 
69. Michael W. McComell, Why "Separation" Is Not the Key to Church-State 
Relations, 107 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 43, 46 (Jan. 19, 1989). 
70. Michael W. McConnell, Free Ezrcise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1118 (1990). 
71. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. California Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 
384 (1990). 
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the Free Exercise Clause did not allow the government to 
enforce a law or policy that burdens the exercise of a sincere 
religious belief unless it is the least restrictive means of 
attaining a particularly important secular ~bjective.?~ 
111. THE EROSION OF FREE EXERCISE BY 
THE R~~HNQUIST COURT 
A. Pre- Smith Cases: Hob bie, O'Lone, 
Lyng, Frazee, and Swaggart 
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals C o m m i s ~ i o n ~ ~  was in 
some senses an unremarkable case that simply extended the 
Sherbert principle to the situation of a woman whose religious 
conflict with her secular duty arose during the course of her 
employment rather than before it. Paula Hobbie had been em- 
ployed by a Florida jeweler for some two and one-half years 
until her discharge. When Hobbie began her employment, she 
was not a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. She 
later became a baptized member of that church, which forbids 
its members from secular activities during the period between 
sundown Friday and sundown Saturday. Although the situation 
of Ms. Hobbie was virtually identical to that of Ms. Sherbert, 
the Florida authorities denied Hobbie's request for unemploy- 
ment compensation benefits on the ground that she had adopt- 
ed new religious beliefs that conflicted with the requirements of 
her job. The Supreme Court reversed, clarifying that the free 
exercise of religion includes the right to adopt new beliefs or to 
convert from one faith to another. Justice Rehnquist Ned a 
dissent in Hobbie stating that  he continued to adhere to his 
dissent in Thomas v. Review Board.74 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Hobbie was the 
Court's rejection of the view of free exercise urged by Solicitor 
General Charles Fried. In an amicus brief for the United 
States, he argued: 
[Flree exercise claims should generally not be entertained 
when the state's actions, rather than prohibiting or directly 
seeking to discourage a religious practice, have an indirect 
72. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 US .  829 (1989); 
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review 
Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
73. 480 U.S. 136 (1987). 
74. Thomas, 450 US. at 720-27 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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and unintended disadvantaging impact on an individual's 
choice to engage in a particular religious practice. Even in 
such cases of indirect disadvantaging, a free exercise claim 
may be made out, however, if (a) the state's action is not 
neutral between religious practices, or between religious and 
other analogous personal choices, or (b) the action bears so 
heavily on an individual's choice as to have virtually the pre- 
clusive effect of a direct pr~hib i t ion .~~ 
The Court did not follow Fried's suggestion on that occasion 
but came to adopt it in an even more extreme form in Smith. 
In that same Term, the Court ruled in Ozone u. Estate of 
S h a b a ~ z ? ~  that prisons do not have to do much to accommo- 
date the prayer life of Muslim prisoners. Fifteen years earlier, 
in Cruz u. Beto, the Court had required the Texas correctional 
system to afford a Buddhist prisoner "a reasonable opportunity 
of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded 
fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious pre- 
cepts."?? This has the flavor of the rule announced by the 
Court in Larson v. Valente, where Justice Brennan wrote: "The 
clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one 
religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over an- 
other."78 Despite the fact that Cruz expressly referred to the 
accommodation of the worship practices of Protestants, Catho- 
lics, and Jews within the state prisons, and despite the court- 
ordered accommodation of the dietary requirements of obser- 
vant Jewish prisoners,7g the Shabazz Court failed even to ac- 
knowledge either Cruz or Sherbert as relevant precedents af- 
fording protection to the free exercise rights of Muslim state 
prisoners. I t  should come as no surprise that the lower courts 
since Smith have given short shrift to the free exercise claims 
brought by such  prisoner^.'^ 
75. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees a t  5, 
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 US. 136 (1986) (No. 85-993). 
76. 482 US. 342 (1987). 
77. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam); see also Cooper v. 
Pate, 378 US. 546 (1964). 
78. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). 
79. Cruz, 405 U.S. at  319-20; see also Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 
1975) (requiring federal prison to provide Orthodox Jewish prisoner with a diet 
that would keep the prisoner in good health without violating kosher laws). 
80. See Al-Alamin v. Gramley, 926 F.2d 680, 685-89 (7th Cir. 1991); Hunafa v. 
Murphy, 907 F.2d 46, 47-49 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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In Lyng u. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,8l 
the Court ruled that the Free Exercise Clause interposed no 
barrier to the Government's logging and road construction 
activities on lands used for religious purposes by several Native 
American tribes. At the heart of Justice O'Connor's proposal of 
an  endorsement test for Establishment Clause cases is the 
concern that the government must never convey a disparaging 
view of the beliefs and practices of religious communities lest 
the members of these groups have cause to perceive themselves 
as outsiders or as second-class ~itizens.'~ Despite the fact that  
there is no group in our history whose religious beliefs and 
practices have been subjected to greater abuse or more system- 
atic violation, there is no trace of O'Comor's concern about the 
second-class character of the Native Americans before the 
Court in Lyng. Indeed, O'Connor even conceded in Lyng that it 
was undisputed that the building of the proposed forest road 
through land held sacred by the Native Americans "could have 
devastating effects on traditional Indian religious prac t i~es . "~~ 
Thus O'Comor appears to have proposed a test in the estab- 
lishment context that she ignores in a free-exercise context, de- 
spite its clear relevance to that concern. 
As if we had not heard enough from the Court on unem- 
ployment compensation cases (Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie), 
the Court accepted another one in the 1988 Term. In Frazee v. 
Illinois Department of Employment Se~urity, '~ the Court was 
able to clarify for the fourth time that unemployment benefits 
may not be withheld from a worker whose religious convictions 
about refraining from work on her Sabbath conflicted with her 
job assignment. Two minor differences from Sherbert were 
present in Frazee. First, the day on which the petitioner re- 
fused to work was Sunday, not Saturday. Second, the basis for 
this refusal arose &om individual conscience rather than from 
the official teaching of a religious body. The Court readily dis- 
posed of those differences and ruled for the religious claimant. 
81. 485 US. 439 (1988). 
82. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); 
Lynch v. Do~e l ly ,  465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Co~or, J., concurring); see also 
Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985) ("[A] core purpose of the 
Establishment Clause is violated" where government action "conveys a message of 
government endorsement or disapproval of religion.") (citation omitted). 
83. Qng ,  485 U.S. at 451. 
84. 489 U.S. 829 (1989). 
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The 1989 Term proved to  be a disaster for free exercise of 
religion. Smith is the precedent that everyone recalls from that 
Term, but religious freedom was also dealt a powerful blow in 
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries u. California Board of Equal iza- 
t i ~ n . ' ~  Pressed for cash to pay its bills after the taxpayer re- 
volt enacted caps on property taxes in Proposition 13, the State 
of California has relied increasingly on other forms of taxation, 
such as sales and use taxes, to raise revenue. The State Board 
of Equalizations6 singled out an unpopular evangelist as the 
target of its efforts to establish a precedent that it had the 
power to  tax the distribution of religious literature. In the 
previous Term, the Court in Texas Monthly, Inc. u. Bullock had 
invalidated under the Establishment Clause a Texas statute 
that provided an exemption for religious literature from sales 
and use taxes, but the Court left open the question of whether 
the Free Exercise Clause required the states t o  refrain from 
imposing a tax on such l i t e ra t~e . '~  The Court answered that 
question resoundingly in the negative in Swaggart Ministries. 
Justice O'Connor wrote for a unanimous Court in Swaggart 
Ministries that "the collection and payment of the generally 
applicable tax in this case imposes no constitutionally signifi- 
cant burden on appellant's religious practices or  belief^."^' 
O'Connor acknowledged that a "more onerous tax rate, even if 
generally applicable, might effectively choke off an adherent's 
religious practices,"89 but she did not think that the tax before 
the Court constituted a choke-hold strangling religious exercise. 
In the wake of the beating of Rodney King, it is no comfort that 
the Court took such a casual attitude toward the notorious and 
lethal "choke-hold" technique employed by the Los Angeles 
Police De~artment.~' It is equally disastrous for religious free- 
dom that the transmission of religious literature to the adher- 
ents of one's own faith may be subjected to one of the most 
complicated forms of taxation ever devised, with relief from 
taxation postponed until a religious organization is being 
choked to death. As if setting the stage for the major reversal 
85. 493 US. 378 (1990). 
86. I love the way California describes its taxing authority. 
87. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). Justice B r e ~ a n ,  writing 
for three Justices, held that a state sales tax exemption for religious publications 
violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 25. 
88. 493 US. at 392. 
89. Id. 
90. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
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to follow in Smith, the Court all but overruled earlier resound- 
ing victories for religious freedom, distinguishing Murdock u. 
Pennsylvaniag1 and Follett v.  Town of McCormickgZ on the 
ground that they were limited t o  a flat occupational tax. And 
Justice O'Connor brushed aside in a single sentence the fear 
that Justice Scalia had voiced in the previous Term in Texas 
Monthly about discriminatory enforcement bf the tax: "There is 
no danger that appellant's religious activity is being singled out 
for special and burdensome treatment.'@3 
The Court also rejected the contention that the "on-site 
inspections of appellant's evangelistic crusades, lengthy on-site 
audits, examinations of appellant's books and records, threats 
of criminal prosecution, and layers of administrative and judi- 
cial  proceeding^'@^ represented an excessive entanglement of 
the government with religion.g5 If the government interferes 
with a religious body, one would normally view such an inter- 
ference as a free exercise violation. But the Court has devel- 
oped this standard as though it were only an aspect of 
e~tablishment.'~ For example, it used the entanglement test to 
invalidate a federal program providing remedial reading and 
math instruction to the children of poor parents:' even 
though there was no evidence whatsoever in the record of the 
" 'detailed monitoring and close administrative contact' between 
secular and religious bodies"g8 that the Swaggart Ministries 
Court held necessary to  make out a claim of excessive entan- 
glement. Evidently, entanglement is in the eyes of the behold- 
er. At least it looks very different when a religious body is 
being taxed (no entanglement) than when children attending a 
religious school are being given aid on an evenhanded basis 
(entanglement). 
91. 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (invalidating application of occupational license tax to 
sale of religious literature by Jehovah's Witnesses). 
92. 321 U.S. 573 (1944). 
93. Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 390. 
94. Id. at 392. 
95. Id. at 392-97. 
96. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971); Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). 
97. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); see also Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. 
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). 
98. 493 U.S. at 395 (quoting Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 696-97 
(1989)). 
210 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
B. The Smith Case 
Whatever one makes of the stingy application of free exer- 
cise doctrine to cases that have come before the Rehnquist 
Court, Smith clearly marked a major shift in free exercise doc- 
trine itself. Smith represents a complete abandonment of the 
compelling state interest and least restrictive alternative test 
that had, a t  least in theory, obtained since Sherbert u. Verner. 
In doing so, the Smith Court completely undercut its own pre- 
cedents. And i t  &d so without any notice or warning that it 
was considering a significant shift in doctrine. No one, not even 
the parties, had an  opportunity to brief the Court in Smith on 
the importance of a constitutional standard that would afford 
appropriate protection to religious exercise. Given the question 
presented for review and the nature of the arguments present- 
ed in  the case, no one in the religious communities thought 
that the pre-Smith standard was a t  risk in Smith. 
The test articulated in Sherbert for free exercise claims had 
been thought secure because of the series of unemployment 
compensation cases to which I made reference above.gs .These 
cases ruled that the government could not burden religious 
freedom unless the burden was justified-because it reflected a 
supreme public necessity-and no less restrictive alternative to 
the burden existed. Under these cases, however, no one made 
the claim that religious faith and conduct were absolutely pro- 
tected, but it was at least clear that the government could not 
penalize a person for exercising religious faith. 
The Smith case involved the sacramental use of peyote in a 
ceremony of the Native American Church. The reverence that 
Native Americans have for the buds of this cactus plant is tied 
to the centuries-old belief that it contains the presence of deity 
and has healing power. Recognizing these convictions, Congress 
and nearly half of the state legislatures expressly exclude the 
sacramental use of peyote from their prohibition of illicit drugs. 
Even though Oregon did not have an exemption of this sort on 
the books a t  the time,'" the Oregon Supreme Court ruled 
that the First Amendment prohibited the State from denying 
unemployment benefits to the two Native Americans who were 
99. See supra text accompanying notes 67-93. 
100. Oregon has recently given statutory protection to the religious use of pey- 
ote. See OR. REV. STAT. 5 475.992 (1991). 
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fired when they acknowledged having participated in the ritu- 
als of their church. The United States Supreme Court reversed 
the state court, abandoning the solid line of unemployment 
compensation cases I mentioned above, including Frazee, a 
unanimous decision the year before. 
If viewed as another drug case, the result in Smith was 
unsurprising. In today's climate of drug wars, the mere pres- 
ence of a non-scheduled drug in a case can turn some pretty 
fine minds to mush. If one is prepared to launch a full scale 
military invasion of Panama in order to apprehend a former 
CIA operative turned drug dealer, I suppose that some will be 
prepared to relax or even bend the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment in order to apprehend drug dealers in our inner 
cities. And I imagine that the same folks who think that 
Fourth Amendment rights must yield when the "D" word is 
invoked will be casual about the First Amendment as well. 
At another level of analysis, however, the Smith case was a 
sweeping disaster for religious liberty because it was not just 
another drug case, but a case about punishing people for their 
religious worship. Thus one might be less angered by the for- 
mal, narrow holding of the case-that unemployment compen- 
sation benefits are unavailable to a person who is fired for 
sacramental use of peyote-than by the Court's abandonment 
of the requirement that the government demonstrate a compel- 
ling secular justification for overriding claims of religious con- 
science. I do not agree with Justice O'Comor's reading of the 
case, but I can understand that reasonable persons-including 
Dean Jesse Choper, an eminent First Amendment scholar who 
was of counsel to the Attorney General of Oregon in  
Smith-could agree that Justice O'Connor correctly found that 
the government has a compelling interest in the regulation of 
the use of illegal drugs. Although she reached this result, she 
refused to sign the opinion of Justice Scalia, who left the pro- 
tection of religious conscience to the tender mercies of the legis- 
latures. Justice O'Connor found this policy "incompatible with 
our Nation's fundamental commitment to individual religious 
liberty."lo1 For her, "the First Amendment was enacted pre- 
cisely to protect the rights of those whose religious practices 
are not shared by the majority and may be viewed with hostili- 
ty ?02 
101. Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (O'Co~or ,  J., concurring in the judgment). 
102. Id. at 902. 
212 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
In the spirit of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in 
Smith, I would like to offer two historical reasons for rejecting 
the Court's decision in Smith. First, the compelling governmen- 
tal interest standard conforms more closely to the historical 
situation a t  the time of the framing of the First Amendment. 
Before Smith there was little scholarly exploration of the his- 
torical justification for religious exemptions. Shortly after 
Smith was decided, however, an article by a leading commenta- 
tor gathered extensive evidence that the original meaning of 
the Free Exercise Clause allowed judges to craft exemptions 
from laws of general applicability.lo3 For example, under nine 
of the original state constitutions-Delaware, Georgia, Mary- 
land, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Rhode Island, and South Carolina-free exercise of religion 
expressly prevailed, to use the phrase of James Madison, 
"where it [did] not trespass on private rights or the public 
peace."lo4 These provisions regarding free exercise of religion 
appear to be an early equivalent of the compelling state inter- 
est requirement. For example, Article 61 of the Georgia State 
Constitution of 1777 provides: "All persons whatever shall have 
the fiee exercise of their religion; provided it be not repugnant 
to the peace and safety of the State."'" If free exercise guar- 
antees may not be read to exempt believers from "otherwise 
valid" laws, what would be the purpose of the "peace and safe- 
ty" proviso? According to Professor M c C o ~ e l l ,  "[tlhese provi- 
sions were the likely model for the federal free exercise guaran- 
tee, and their evident acknowledgement of free exercise exemp- 
tions is the strongest evidence that the framers expected the 
First Amendment to enjoy a similarly broad interpreta- 
tion."lo6 
The majority in Smith is composed of judges who often 
complain that judges should not exceed their limited task of 
construing the constitutional text in line with the intentions of 
the framers. But these same judges ignored the historical evi- 
dence about the intent of the framers of the Free Exercise 
Clause. Professor M c C o ~ e l l  offered several examples of ex- 
103. Michael W. McCo~el l ,  The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990). 
104. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 9 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 98, 100 (G. Hunt ed., 1901). 
105. 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER 
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 383 (Ben Poore ed., 1878). 
106. McConnell, supra note 70, at 1118. 
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emptions of religion from generally applicable laws that date 
from the beginning of the republic, implying that the framers of 
the Free Exercise Clause intended to assert the primacy of 
religious conscience over secular laws by protecting the right to 
actively fulfill religious duties without state interference. Rath- 
er than account for this sort of evidence, the majority in Smith 
invented their own judge-made policy restricting the protection 
of the Religion Clause to overt intentional discrimination 
against religion. 
The Smith Court did not show the slightest regard for 
serious legal history. Instead, it asserted that laws of general 
applicability are now to be presumed valid even if they serious- 
ly interfere with someone's religious beliefs or practices. Ac- 
cording to Justice Scalia, the only laws that the Free Exercise 
Clause prohibits are those "specifkally directed at . . . religious 
practice,"lo7 i.e., those intended to stifle a particular religion. 
Anyone having a glancing acquaintance with politics knows 
that no legislature will be cmde enough to admit that the pur- 
pose of its legislation is to harm a vulnerable religious organi- 
zation. Since, in Scalia's view, the nation cannot "afford the 
of striking down laws because they violate religious 
belief, individuals must rely on the political process for legisla- 
tive protection of their beliefs and practices. Justice Blackmun 
wrote in a sharp dissent: "I do not believe the Founders 
thought their dearly bought freedom from religious persecution 
a 'luxury,' but an essential element of liberty."loS 
Second, requiring a government attorney to demonstrate 
the relative signifkance of the government's interest before it 
may prevail over a sincere religious claim may be more neces- 
sary in our period of the republic than in the founding period 
precisely because government a t  all levels is now far more 
intrusive than it was at the time of the founding. As one com- 
mentator has noted, "The style and scope of twentieth century 
government has led to its involvement with ends and values of 
varying imp~rtance.""~ As Professor Mcconnell has argued, 
religious exemptions are more necessary after the New Deal 
107. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. 
108. Id. at 889. 
109. Id. at 909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
110. Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal De- 
velopment: Part I. The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1381, 1388 
(1967). 
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than in  the founding period since "[tlhe growth of the modern 
welfare-regulatory state has vastly increased the occasions for 
conflict between government and religion.""' 
C. Post- Smith Developments 
The consequences for religious liberty that have ensued 
since Smith have been disastrous. The cases discussed in this 
section illustrate graphically why the judiciary must not aban- 
don its responsibility to enforce the limits placed on our govern- 
ment by the Bill of Rights. The Smith Court suggested that any 
exemption for religious conduct from generally applicable laws 
must come from the legislatures, not from the courts. The 
Court acknowledged that "leaving accommodation [of religion] 
to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage 
those religious practices that are not widely engaged in."'" 
This drastically understates the problem. The real consequence 
of Smith is that sincere religiously based conduct is not to be 
afforded significant protection from majoritarian control. Send- 
ing unpopular religious minorities to city councils and State 
legislatures for relief is like sending the Jehovah's Witnesses to 
the very legislative bodies in the 1930s that were doing their 
level best to get rid of them.ll3 
After Smith, governmental agencies have recklessly disre- 
garded the protections that the Constitution affords to religious 
conscience, belying the promise in Smith that the political 
branches of government can safely be entrusted with the exclu- 
sive duty of protecting the first of our civil liberties. For exam- 
ple, a t  the level of local government, zoning laws have been in- 
voked both to prohibit a church from beginning its ministry 
and even to regulate the number of persons to whom a church 
may minister.ll4 Zero-population growth may be desirable in 
111. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 
23. 
112. Smith, 494 U.S. a t  890. 
113. See, e.g., DAVID R. MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR: THE FLAG-SALUTE 
CONTROVERSY (1962); JOHN T. NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE 
233-55 (1987); Richard Danzig, How Questions Begot Answers in Fdix Frankfurter's 
First Flag Salute Opinion, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 257. 
114. See, e-g., Bethel Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Village of Morton, 559 
N.E.2d 533 (Ill. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 564 N.E.2d 835 (Ill. 1990) (postSmith 
cap on enrollment of students in parochial school); see also R. Gustav Niebuhr, 
Here Is The Church; As for the People, They're Picketing It, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 
1991, a t  Al. 
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a particular local community, but the application of this policy 
to a church's membership is the clearest example imaginable of 
an  instance of governmental overreaching. At the federal level, 
we have even had regulations purporting to tell the Amish 
what to wear when they raise a barn.l15 
. In a little-publicized case, the City of New York recently 
invoked handicap access regulations to close down a shelter 
operated by Catholic nuns for the homeless on the second floor 
of a walk-up because the facility did not have an  elevator. The 
nuns-members of Mother Teresa's religious order--offered to 
carry upstairs any handicapped persons they encountered, but 
the City would brook no exception to its neutral, generally en- 
forceable rules. The City should have taken the prize for the 
most frivolous governmental interest ever asserted against a 
religious body engaged in charitable activity-the view that it 
is better for the homeless to sleep in the street than in a build- 
ing without an elevator. Under the Smith analysis, however, a 
"generally applicable," if not very serious, rule was enough to 
shut down a religious mission. The bureaucracy won, and the 
nuns and the homeless lost.'16 
The result of Smith is not just that the political branches 
will find it hard to comprehend the need for properly drafted 
religious exemptions from generally applicable rules. An even 
more scandalous consequence of Smith is that federal judges 
have shown signs of callous disregard for the first of our civil 
liberties. The judicial record after Smith betrays a remarkable 
insensitivity to religious liberty that requires remedial legisla- 
tion by Congress. For example, in St. Agnes Hospital u. 
Riddick,ll7 the district court found a compelling interest in 
requiring a religious hospital to teach all residents how to 
perform abortions. The lower court was apparently unaware of 
the Court's diminution of the compelling interest requirement 
in Smith. What is most striking about the case is that even on 
115. See, e.g., OSHA Notice CPL 2 (Nov. 5, 1990) (postSmith revocation of ex- 
emption for Amish and Sikhs from requirement of wearing hard hats on construc- 
tion sites). OSHA has withdrawn this regulation in part because of the interven- 
tion of the principal co-sponsor of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Congress- 
man Stephen Solarz. The important thing to heed is that Smith sent to adminis- 
trative agencies the message that they could--or, worse yet, they should-write 
regulations with no care whatever for their impact on religious freedom. 
116. Sam Roberts, Fight City Hall? Nope, Not Even Mother Teresa, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 17, 1990, at B1. 
117. 748 F. Supp. 319 (D. Md. 1990). 
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a belief so deeply and widely held as conscientious objection to 
performing abortions, state officials ignored the Court's sugges- 
tions that "it is desirable" for the political branches to provide 
free exercise exemptions. l8 
In Salvation Army v. Department of Community Af- 
fairs,''' the court decided that Smith required it to reject the 
church's free exercise claim to an exemption from disclosure 
requirements in the state's Room and Boarding Act. On re- 
mand, the government may yet be required by the court to 
demonstrate a serious need to know the identity of the down- 
and-outers aided by the Salvation Army. Under Smith, howev- 
er, the church must now claim its exemption from the state's 
reporting requirements-which the court acknowledged would 
dissuade people in need of help from participating in the 
church's rehabilitation program-by pressing a free speech 
right or a right deriving from associational freedom, not one 
grounded in the religious character of the church's ministry. 
In Montgomery v. County of C l i n t ~ n , ' ~ ~  a generally appli- 
cable, facially neutral law requiring autopsies was applied to 
an  Orthodox Jew, for whom the mutilation of the body is a 
sacrilege, and for whom burial must take place before sundown 
on the day of death. Since the man had died in an auto acci- 
dent, whatever interest the government might have in ascer- 
taining the cause of death of its citizens should have been sat- 
isfied. Yet once again, a mechanical approach to "generally 
applicable" norms was allowed to trump a sincerely held reli- 
gious tenet-in a manner that was manifestly not the least re- 
strictive alternative means of effectuating the government's 
interests. In Yang u. Sturner,"' another district court "regret- 
fully" dismissed, on the basis of Smith, its earlier determina- 
tion that the government was required to accommodate the 
religious objection of Vietnamese Hmong to autopsies. 
In Hunafa v. Murphy,'" the Seventh Circuit remanded a 
suit by a Muslim state prisoner who had objected to service of 
meals containing pork. The court noted, however, that Smith 
had "cut back, possibly to minute dimensions, the doctrine that 
118. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 184, 197-98 (1973) (upholding conscience 
clause protecting doctors and nurses who refuse to participate in abortions). 
119. 919 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1990). 
120. 743 F. Supp. 1253 (W.D. Mich. 1990), affd, 940 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1991). 
121. 728 F. Supp. 845 (D.R.I.), withdmwn, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990). 
122. 907 F.2d 46 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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requires government to accommodate, at some cost, minority 
religious preferences."lZ3 
This political and judicial overkill in reaction to Smith is 
akin to the reaction against the Jehovah's Witnesses in the 
wake of the Court's first flag-salute case, Minersville School 
District v. Gobitis,'* including licensing of the Witnesses and 
waves of violent attacks on the Witnesses both by the police 
and by vigilante mobs in order to drive them out of a state? 
The majority opinion in Smith betrays massive insensitivity 
not only to the history surrounding the adoption of the Free 
Exercise Clause by the First Congress, but also to the history 
surrounding its own precedents in  this century. The Court cited 
Gobitis approvingly three times in Smith without even men- 
tioning that it had been overruled in West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette.lZ6 
The circumstances of Barnette are themselves instructive 
for our times. The second flag-salute case came to the Court in  
the middle of the Second World War. By then, the Justices 
were fully aware of the brutal oppression of minorities by total- 
itarian governments in Germany and Italy. I t  was against the 
background of the Niirnberg rallies with their massed flags and 
swastikas that the Court reexamined the view that the nation- 
al interest required the Jehovah's Witnesses to face criminal 
sanctions rather than saluting an  object they sincerely regard 
as  a "graven image" which the second commandment forbids 
them fiom worshipping.12' In this setting, the Court clearly 
adopted a standard that protected religious fieedom and free- 
dom of speech far more broadly than the suggestion in Smith 
that these freedoms are adequately secured merely by com- 
manding the government to refrain from discrimination. Jus- 
tice Roberts proclaimed a far broader vision of freedom in these 
ringing terms: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe 
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or 
act their faith therein."lZ8 
123. Id. at 48. 
124. 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
125. See, e.g., PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS 22-23 (1988). 
126. 319 US. 624, 642 (1943). 
127. See Exodus 20:4; Deuteronomy 5:8. 
128. 319 US. at 642 (emphasis added). 
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It would be unfair to suggest that the Court intended all of 
the far-reaching and outrageous results discussed above, 
whether against the Jehovah's Witnesses in the 1940s or 
against religion generally in the 1990s. But the damage to 
religious freedom since Smith has been real, whether intended 
or not, just as the damage to  religious freedom after Gobitis 
was palpable and real, whether or not Justice Frankfurter and 
his colleagues could fairly be said to have intended those harm- 
ful results. 
Rightly understood, the Free Exercise Clause should 
breathe life into the rest of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
Religious liberty is the foundation of, and is integrally related 
to, all other rights and freedoms secured by the Constitution. If 
the power of government to coerce in matters of conscience is 
denied, government is limited indeed. It follows, for example, 
that it may not disturb religious belief and conduct any more 
than it may curb free expression of political ideas. In the words 
of the Williamsburg Charter, religious freedom is a "basic civil 
liberty. . . ineradicable from the long tradition of rights and 
liberties from which the [American] Revolution sprang."12g 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR REMEDLAZ, LEGISLATION 
For these reasons I recommend that Congress enact legis- 
lation that would restore the requirement that when a law 
burdens a sincerely held religious belief or practice, the govern- 
ment may prevail over the religious adherent only if it demon- 
strates both that its interest in the law is truly compelling or of 
paramount significance and that the means chosen to effectu- 
ate the governmental interest are the least restrictive alterna- 
tive. 
Congress has acted in the past to  protect rights more gen- 
erously than the judiciary has chosen to do. For example, in 
1986 the Court ruled that Jews were subject to dishonorable 
discharge from the military for wearing yarmulkes.130 Con- 
gress responded promptly with legislation that reversed this 
oppressive result.lsl No one has seriously suggested that Con- 
gress lacked the power to enact this provision. Indeed, Justice 
Rehnquist's opinion fairly invited legislation by referring to  the 
129. The Williamsburg Charter, supra note 28, at 8. 
130. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
3 1 .  10 U.S.C. 8 774 (1988). 
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federal power to regulate the armed forces, a provision express- 
ly given to Congress in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. 
And I know of no commentator who has suggested that  this 
legislation is invalid under the Establishment Clause. For 
example, the Court unanimously sustained a provision in Title 
VII exempting religious bodies from the general ban on employ- 
ment discrimination on the basis of re1igi0n.l~~ 
The Smith Court did not reflect judicial restraint appropri- 
ate in a democracy, but rather abdicated the proper judicial 
function of assuring that unpopular minorities will also have 
the benefit of First Amendment protections when legislatures 
turn a deaf ear to these minorities. To return to the parties 
most directly affected by the Smith case, we need to walk with 
the Native Americans down the long trail of broken promises 
that they have travelled in  this country. In order to apply the 
Golden Rule to this case, we have but to ask whether Jews 
would be willing to have the government ban the Seder because 
a new prohibition law failed to provide an exception for liturgi- 
cal use of wine, or whether Christians would be willing to let 
the state exclude teenagers from participating in the celebra- 
tion of Mass or the Lord's Supper because it cannot be proven 
in court that a law of general applicability (the legal age for 
drinking) was, in Scalia's words, "specifically directed a t  . . . 
religious pra~t ice ," '~  or intended to stifle a particular reli- 
gion. 
The sacramental use of peyote, based on the view that 
deity is present within the cactus plant from which peyote is 
derived, may strike most of us as bizarre. That fact, which used 
to be constitutionally irrelevant, has now become politically 
relevant. To return to the Golden Rule, we need to think about 
some aspect of our faith and practice that we would not want 
the government to suppress because a majority of outsiders 
find it strange. Then we need to think back to the point in the 
history of our own religious organization when it was small and 
vulnerable (all of us were in that position at one time or moth- 
er). Would we want our religious convictions to be governed by 
the will of a hostile majority a t  that moment? 
The Williamsburg Charter eloquently answers this ques- 
tion: 
132. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
133. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). 
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Religious liberty finally depends on neither the favors of the 
state and its officials nor the vagaries of tyrants or majorities. 
Religious liberty in a democracy is a right that may not be 
submitted to vote and depends on the outcome of no election. 
A society is only as  just and free as  i t  is respectful of this 
right, especially toward the beliefs of its smallest minorities 
and least popular comm~nities.'~' 
James Madison was right when he wrote in his famous 
Memorial and Remonstrance that the time to take alarm is a t  
"first experiment with our liberties."'" Because I am truly 
alarmed a t  the disastrous consequences for religious liberty 
that have already flowed from the Smith case, I hope that 
Congress will act promptly to repudiate the tragic experiment 
with religious liberty that the Smith case represents. I support 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as appropriate remedial 
legislation designed to accomplish that end.'" 
When the judiciary gives a minimalist interpretation of the 
importance of religious liberty, it is time for the political 
branches of government to extend greater protection through 
legislation grounded in the values secured by the Bill of Rights. 
And when we, the People, encourage our representatives to 
safeguard the first of our civil liberties, religious freedom, we 
are doing the very thing that this bicentennial season demands 
of us: securing "the Blessings of Liberty for ourselves and our 
Posterity" and promoting that "more perfect Union" that our 
Constitution was ordained to establish.13' 
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